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The Similarity Heuristic 
 
 
 
 
Decision makers are often called on to make snap judgments using fast-and- frugal decision 
rules called cognitive heuristics.  Although early research into cognitive heuristics 
emphasized their limitations, more recent research has focused on their high level of 
accuracy.  In this paper we investigate the performance a subset of the representativeness 
heuristic which we call the similarity heuristic.   Decision makers who use it judge the 
likelihood that an instance is a member of one category rather than another by the degree to 
which it is similar to others in that category.  We provide a mathematical model of the 
heuristic and test it experimentally in a trinomial environment.  The similarity heuristic turns 
out to be a reliable and accurate choice rule and both choice and response time data suggest it 
is also how choices are made. 
 
Keywords:   heuristics and biases, fast-and-frugal heuristics, similarity, representative design, 
base-rate neglect, Bayesian inference 
A heuristic is a decision rule that provides an approximate solution to a problem that 
either cannot be solved analytically or can only be solved at a great cost (Rozoff, 1964). 
Cognitive heuristics are analogous ‘mental shortcuts’ for making choices and judgments. Two 
familiar examples are the availability heuristic (judge an event frequency by the ease with 
which instances of the event can be recalled; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), and the 
recognition heuristic (if you recognize only one item in a set, choose that one; Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2002).  Cognitive heuristics work by means of what Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) call attribute substitution, by which a difficult or impossible judgment of one kind is 
substituted with a related and easier judgment of another kind. The recognition heuristic, for 
instance, substitutes the recognition of only a single option in a pair for the more costly 
process of searching for, selecting and evaluating information about both options.  A central 
feature of cognitive heuristics is that while they are efficient in terms of time and processing 
resources, they achieve this at some cost in accuracy or generality.  As an example, when 
events are highly memorable for reasons unrelated to frequency, the availability heuristic can 
overestimate their probability. 
Early research into cognitive heuristics emphasized how they could produce systematic 
biases (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982).  Indeed, these biases were often the primary 
evidence that the heuristic was being used.  Later research has emphasized the adaptive nature 
of heuristics, emphasizing their capacity to quickly and efficiently produce accurate 
inferences and judgments (Gigerenzer & Todd and the ABC research group, 1999; Samuels, 
Stich & Bishop, 2002).  To use the term introduced by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), 
heuristics are ‘fast-and-frugal’: they allow accurate decisions to be made quickly using 
relatively little information and processing capacity.    
As Gilovich and Griffin (2003) observe, however, this new emphasis has not been 
applied to the ‘classic’ heuristics first described by Kahneman and Tversky (1973).  One 
reason is that the two approaches to heuristics come from different research traditions that 
have asked different questions, and adopted correspondingly different methods.  The modal 
question asked by the earliest researchers was ‘do people use heuristic X?’, while those in the 
fast-and-frugal tradition started with ‘how good is heuristic X?’.  These two questions are 
answered using different research strategies.  The first strategy is a form of what Brunswik 
(1955) called a systematic design, the second related to what he called a representative 
design. In a systematic design the stimuli are chosen to permit the efficient testing of 
hypotheses; in the representative design the stimuli are literally a representative sample, in the 
statistical sense, drawn from the domain to which the results are to be generalized (Dhami, 
Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2004). 
If misinterpreted, the use of a systematic design can exaggerate the importance of 
atypical circumstances.  The experimental conditions tested are usually chosen so that 
different judgment or choice rules predict different outcomes, and since one of those rules is 
usually the normatively optimal rule, and the purpose of the experiment is to show that a 
different rule is in operation, the experiment invariably reveals behavior that deviates from the 
normative rule.  For instance, studies of the availability heuristic are designed to show that, 
whenever using the heuristic will lead to systematic under- or over-estimation of event 
frequency, this is what occurs.  Many early observers concluded that such findings showed 
evidence of systematic and almost pathological irrationality (e.g. Nisbett & Ross, 1980; 
Piatelli-Palmarini, 1996; Plous, 1993; Sutherland, 1992). The extent of the irrationality 
observed, however, may have been the result of the use of a systematic design, combined with 
an interpretation of the results from using that design as being typicali. If the goal is to 
measure how well a decision rule or heuristic performs, a more representative design should 
be usedii.  
In this paper we investigate the representativeness heuristic, one of the classic 
heuristics first described by Kahneman and Tversky (1972), who defined it as follows:  
A person who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of an uncertain event, or a 
sample, by the degree to which it is: [i] similar in essential properties to its parent 
population; and [ii] reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated.  
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972 p. 431) 
The heuristic has two parts, one based on the similarity between sample and population, the 
other based on beliefs about the sampling process itself (Joram & Read, 1996).  The focus in 
this paper is on one aspect of Part [i], which we refer to as the similarity heuristiciii, according 
to which the judged similarity between an event and possible populations of events is 
substituted for its posterior probability. An example of this substitution is found in responses 
to the familiar “Linda” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Because Linda is more similar 
to a ‘feminist bank-teller’ than a mere ‘bank-teller,’ she is judged to be more likely to be a 
feminist bank-teller (Shafir, Smith and Osherson, 1990).   
An important study, using a systematic design, of what we call the similarity heuristic 
was conducted by Bar-Hillel (1974).  Her subjects made judgments about sets of three bar 
charts like those in Figure 1, labeled L, M and R for left, middle and right.  The Similarity 
group judged whether M was more similar to L or R. The Likelihood of populations group was 
told that M represented a sample that might have been drawn either from population L or R, 
and judged which population M was more likely to come from, and the Likelihood of samples 
group was told that M represented a population that might have generated either sample L or 
R, and judged which sample was more likely to be generated from M.  If the similarity 
heuristic is used, all three judgments would coincide.  Bar-Hillel systematically designed the 
materials so that this coincidence could easily be observed.  All the triples had the following 
properties: 
1. Every bar in M was midway in height between the bars of the same color in L and R.  
2. The rank-order of the bar heights in M coincided with those in either L or R, but not 
both.  
3. When M was interpreted as describing a population and L and R were interpreted as 
samples, then the sample with same rank-order as M was the least probable. 
4. Likewise, when L and R were interpreted as populations and M as a sample, then M was 
less likely to be drawn from the population whose rank-order it matched.  
In other words, the stimuli were systematically designed to ensure that, under both 
interpretations of likelihood, the objective odds favored the same chart, which was not the 
chart with the same rank-order as M.  In Figure 1, sample M is more likely to be drawn from 
population R, and sample R is more likely to be drawn from population M, although the rank-
order of the bar-heights in M is the same as that of L.  Bar-Hillel correctly anticipated that 
both similarity and likelihood judgments would be strongly influenced by rank-order. 
 
 
—Figure 1 about here –  
 
Although this study is very elegant, for our purposes it has two shortcomings, both 
related to the fact that the stimuli were highly unusualiv.  First, the stimuli all had the same 
atypical pattern, which may have suggested the use of judgment rules that would not have 
been used otherwise.  For instance, the rule ‘choose the one with the same rank-order’ was 
easy to derive from the stimuli, and could then be applied to every case – in other words, the 
attribute ‘rank-order’ rather than ‘similarity’ could have been substituted for ‘likelihood.’  
This possibility is enhanced by the presentation of stimuli as bar charts rather than as 
disaggregated samples, and the use of lines to connect the bars.  Both features make rank-
order extremely salient. 
Moreover, the use of a systematic design means the study does not indicate how 
accurate the similarity heuristic is relative to the optimal decision rule, even for bar charts 
connected by lines.  When the majority similarity judgment is used to predict the majority 
choice in the Likelihood of Populations group, the error rate was 90%. But since only a tiny 
proportion of cases actually meet the four conditions specified above, this number is 
practically unrelated to the overall accuracy of the heuristic. Indeed, the fact that respondents 
make errors in Bar-Hillel’s study is highly dependent on the precise choice of stimuli.   In the 
illustrative stimuli of Figure 1, if the bar heights in L are slightly changed to those indicated 
by the dashed lines (a 5% shift from yellow to green), then the correct answer changes from L 
to R (the probability that R is correct changes from .41 to .65).      
One goal of the experiment described in this paper is to address the issues implied by 
this analysis.  First, we elicit choices and judgments of similarity in an environment in which 
the relationship between sample and population varies randomly.  Second, because we 
examine a random sample of patterns in this environment, we are able to assess the efficiency 
of the similarity heuristic.  Our method was deliberately designed to find a point of contact 
between the two traditions of research in heuristics – the early tradition exemplified by 
Kahneman and Tversky’s work, and the later tradition exemplified by the work of Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein (1996).  Our research shows there is no fundamental divide between these 
traditions.  As a first step, we describe a precise and testable model of the similarity heuristic.    
 
A Model of the Similarity Heuristic 
The similarity heuristic is a member of what is perhaps the broadest class of decision 
rules, those in which the decision to act on (or to choose, or to guess) one hypothesis rather 
than another is based on the relative value of a decision statistic computed for each 
hypothesis. In the most basic version of this class, one hypothesis is chosen because the 
decision statistic favors that hypothesis more than any other and, if two or more hypotheses 
share the same maximum decision statistic, one is chosen using a tie-breaking procedure.  In 
the context of such models, a wide range of decision statistics have been proposed.   Some of 
these are objective relationships between the data and the hypotheses.  Amongst these are the 
likelihood, and the posterior probability computed from Bayes’ rule.  These decision statistics 
are particularly important because they constitute the theoretical benchmark for the 
performance of a decision rule.   Several other “objective” decision statistics are those 
discussed recently by Nilsson, Olsson and Juslin (2005) in the context of probability 
judgment.  Indeed, two of these are operationalizations of ‘similarity’ based on Medin and 
Schaffer’s (1978) context theory of learning, comprising an adaptation of one interpretation of 
the representativeness heuristic originating in Kahneman and Frederick (2002), and the other 
is their own exemplar-based model.  The decision statistic can also be – and indeed when 
making choices typically is – a subjective relationship between data and hypothesis.   
Recognition is such a subjective relationship, where the recognition of an object can be used 
as the basis for making a judgment such as ’the object is large.’  The feeling or judgment of 
similarity between data and hypothesis is another subjective relationship, and the one we 
focus on. 
We will illustrate with a simple decision problem.  Imagine you are birdwatching in a 
marshy area in South England, and hear a song that might belong to the redshank, a rare bird 
whose song can be confused with that of a common greenshank.  You must decide whether or 
not to wade into the marsh in hope of seeing a redshank.  In normative terms, your problem is 
whether the expected utility of searching (s) for the redshank is greater than that of not 
searching ( s ): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p r d u s r p g d u s g p r d u s r p g d u s g+ > +
 , 
(1) 
where ( )p r d  is the probability it is a redshank given the data (i.e., the song), ( )p g d  is the 
probability it is a greenshank given the data, ( )u s r  is the utility of searching given that it is 
a redshank, and so on.  The probabilities are evaluated with Bayes’ rule, which draws on 
likelihoods and the prior probability of each hypothesis, ( )p r  and ( )p g .  If we substitute 
the multiplication posterior = prior × likelihood into (1), and rearrange terms, the decision 
rule is to search if 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
p r p d r u s g u s g
p g p d g u s r u s r
−
>
−
  (2) 
If all the utilities are equal, this reduces to searching if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).p r p d r p g p d g>  
When using the similarity heuristic, the probabilities are replaced with similarity 
judgments, ( ),s d r  and ( ),s d g : respectively, the similarity of the song to the redshank’s and 
the greenshank’s. According to the similarity heuristic, you should search if  
( ) ( ), , .s d r s d g>  (3) 
That is, search if the birdsong you have just heard sounds (to you) more similar to that of the 
redshank than that of the greenshank.   
Within a given environment, the theoretical performance of a decision rule can be 
estimated by computing the proportion of times it yields the correct answer, relative to the 
same proportion for the optimal decision rule.  We show how to estimate the performance of 
the similarity heuristic against the Bayesian benchmark. 
The decision model begins with a vector of decision statistics.   For the similarity 
heuristic, these statistics are judgments of similarity between the sample or case (the data) and 
the population from which it might have been drawnv.  For each of the n possible hypotheses, 
,   1,..., ,ih i n=  and the data, ,jd  the decision maker generates a similarity judgment ( ), .j is d h  
The set of n judgments form a similarity vector 1 2[ , ,..., ]j j njs s s′ =js , where ( ) ,ij j is s d h= .    
Given the similarity vector, the next step is to pick out the maximum value from this 
vector, which is done by assigning 1 if ijs  takes the maximum value within js , and 0 
otherwise, yielding the maximum similarity vector, with the same dimensions as :js  
( )
1 2
1 max[ , .... ],  where 
0
ij
j j nj ij
if s
ms ms ms ms
otherwise
 =
′ = = 

j
j
s
ms  (4) 
In the simplest decision rule, hi is chosen if the maximum similarity vector contains 
only a single value of 1 in the i-th position.  If there is more than one such value, meaning that 
more than one hypothesis ties for maximum decision statistic, each candidate hypothesis has 
an equal chance of being chosen.  The operation of this rule is implemented in the decision 
vector :jds  
1 2
1,...,
[ , ,..., ],  where ijj j nj ij
ij
i n
ms
ds ds ds ds
ms
=
′ = =
∑j
ds ,  (5) 
The value of dsij, therefore, is the probability the choice rule will select hypothesis hi.  
To calculate the probability that, for a given piece of evidence, this choice rule will 
select the correct option, we pre-multiply the decision vector by the vector of corresponding 
posterior probabilities ( ′jpl ) computed using Bayes’ rule: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2
1,...,
[ , .... ],  where  i j ij j nj ij i j
i j i
i n
p h p d h
pl pl pl pl p h d
p h p d h
=
′ = = =
∑
jpl  (6) 
Hence, given a set of hypotheses { },  1,..., ,iH h i n= =  a choice rule js , prior probabilities p, 
and evidence jd , the accuracy of the choice rule, meaning the probability of making a correct 
decision, is given by: 
( )
1,...,
, , , j ij ij
i n
A H d pl ds
=
= ⋅ = ∑j j js p pl ds  (7) 
Next, we determine the performance of the choice rule given this hypothesis set and all 
possible evidence that might occur.  The evidence could be, for instance, every bird song that 
might be heard. If the evidence is discrete (e.g., we might hear one of a finite number, m, of 
possible sounds) the corresponding mean accuracy is:  
( )
1 1
, ,
m n
j ij ij
j i
A H pd pl ds
= =
=∑ ∑S p , (8) 
where S  is the n m×  matrix representing the similarity of each piece of evidence to each 
hypothesis, and jpd  denotes the probability of obtaining evidence dj.  
Just as the evidence can vary, so can the prior probabilities associated with a given set 
of hypotheses. For instance, you might be in a situation where house sparrows are rare and 
Spanish sparrows are common, or the reverse. To obtain the mean accuracy of the decision 
rule we need to carry out the summation in Eq. (8) over the entire space of possible prior 
probability distributions: 
( ) ( )
1 1 1
, | ,
r m n
k k k
j ij ij
k j i
A H E Correct H pp pd pl ds
= = =
= =∑ ∑ ∑S S , (9) 
where H is the hypothesis set.  The superscript k is added to the probabilities of obtaining 
evidence dj, and to the posterior probabilities, to indicate that their values assume a specific 
vector k of possible priors. The summation is carried out over the discrete set of prior 
probability vectors, while multiplying by the probability of each prior probability vector, 
denoted by .kpp  Note that while the operation of the similarity heuristic (although not its 
performance) is independent of the distribution of prior probabilities, other rules need not be.  
To model Bayes’ rule, for instance, dsij in Eq. (9) is replaced by kijpl . 
The above analysis focuses on deterministic choice rules.  Although this is not the 
place to develop theories of stochastic choice, they can be modeled by means of Monte Carlo 
simulations of A(S,H) in which the vectors (e.g.,  s΄, ms΄, ds) are changed in the relevant 
fashion.  The role of error, for instance, can be modeled by laying a noise distribution over the 
similarity vector (s΄), bias by systematically changing some values of the same vector, and a 
trembling hand by random or even systematic changes to the decision vector (ds)vi.   
 We illustrate our analysis and some of its implications with a simulation of the 
likelihood heuristic, for which  likelihoods, ( )ip d h , rather than similarity judgments, are the 
decision statistic.  Likelihoods are often taken as a proxy for similarity (Villejoubert & 
Mandel, 2002; Nilsson, Olsson & Juslin, 2005) and the representativeness heuristic has even 
been interpreted as being equivalent to the likelihood heuristic (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987)  
This analysis, therefore, can provide us with some expectations about when the similarity 
heuristic is likely to perform well, and when it will perform poorly.   
We consider a simple “binomial balls in urns” environment, such as the one adopted by 
Grether (1980, 1992) and Camerer (1987).  Imagine two urns (the hypotheses), denoted A and 
B, each containing red and white balls in known proportions, denoted RA and RB, that is, 
{ },A BH R R= .  The decision maker obtains a random sample of 5 balls drawn from an unseen 
urn, and must then bet on whether it was drawn from urn A or B. Corresponding to each 
possible sample, e.g., { }jd RRWRW= , and each hypothesis, there is a 
likelihood, ( )ij j il p d h= , which can be computed from the binomial distribution.  The 
decision statistic vector is the vector of likelihoods ,Aj Bjl l′  =  jl .  Each such vector is 
transformed, by means of Eq. (4) and (5), into a decision vector ′jdl , equal to 
[ ]1 0    if Aj Bjl l> , 1 12 2    if Aj Bjl l=   , and [ ]0 1    if Aj Bjl l< .  The probability of a correct 
choice is obtained by pre-multiplying this decision vector by the posterior (Bayesian) 
probability vector, to give ( ), , , jA H djl p .  The overall accuracy of the likelihood 
heuristic, ( ), ,L pA H , is obtained by computing the probability of correct choices for each 
sample, weighting each of these probabilities by the probability of obtaining the sample, and 
then summing these weighted probabilities. 
Table 1 shows the results of this analysis.  The top row shows hypothesis sets, chosen to 
represent a wide range of differences between populations. When { }.5,.5H = the populations 
have no distinguishing characteristics, while when { }.9,.1H =  they look very different.  In 
the identification of birds, a population of house sparrows and Spanish sparrows is close to 
the first case, while house sparrows and sparrow hawks are like the second.  The first column 
in the table gives the prior probabilities for each urn, [ ],A Bp p′ =p . The final row in the table 
presents ( ), ,A HL p , the average accuracy of the likelihood heuristic for each hypothesis set.  
Because the likelihood heuristic, like the similarity heuristic, is not influenced by prior 
probabilities this value is the same for all cells in its column.  The values in the middle cells 
show the incremental accuracy from using Bayes’ rule instead of the likelihood heuristic, 
given each vector of priors, i.e. ( ) ( ), , , ,A H A H−B p L p .  
If the likelihood heuristic is a good proxy for the similarity heuristic, this analysis 
indicates when the similarity heuristic is likely to perform well relative to Bayes’ rule, and 
when it will perform poorly.  These conditions were described formally by Edwards, Lindman 
& Savage (1963).  Roughly, they are that (a) the likelihoods strongly favor some set of 
hypotheses; (b) the prior probabilities of these hypotheses are approximately equal; and (c) 
the prior probabilities of other hypotheses never ‘enormously’ exceed the average value in 
(b).   In Table 1, condition (a) becomes increasingly applicable when moving from left to 
right, and condition (b) when moving from bottom to topvii.  If we replace ‘likelihood’ in (a) 
with ‘similarity’, then these are also the conditions in which the similarity heuristic is likely to 
perform well.  Likewise, when the conditions are not met, the similarity heuristic will do 
poorly. 
 
-- Table 1 about here – 
 
The Experiment 
We investigated how well the similarity heuristic performs as a choice rule, and 
whether people actually use it.  In four experimental conditions, judgments or choices were 
made about two populations and a single sample.  Separate groups assessed the similarity of 
the sample to the populations (a single estimate of ( ) ( )2 1, ,s d h s d h− ), or chose the 
population from which the sample was most likely to have been drawn.  
The populations and samples were, like those in Bar-Hillel’s (1974) study, drawn from 
a trinomial environment. Within this environment, we adopted a representative design. Two 
populations (hypotheses) were generated using a random sampling procedure.  The 
populations used were the first 240 drawn using this procedure, which were randomly paired 
with one another.  A random sample was then drawn, with replacement, from one of the 
populations in the pair, and the first sample drawn from each pair was the one used in the 
experiment.  The populations and samples were shown as separate elements arranged in 
random order, as shown in Figure 2, and not in the form of summary statistics.  We call each 
set of populations and sample a triple. 
 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 
We also considered the relationship between and the similarity heuristic and the use of 
prior probability information.  As discussed in section 2 above, the similarity heuristic makes 
the same choice as Bayes’ rule whenever 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2 2sgn , , sgns d h s d h p h p d h p h p d h −  =  −     .  Since the similarity 
heuristic disregards prior probabilities, it can lead to error when these are not 
equal ( ) ( )( )1 2p h p h≠ .  In the experiment we chose the population from which the sample 
was chosen with a (virtual) throw of the dice, with prior probabilities of 1/6 and 5/6.   One 
choice group had knowledge of the prior probabilities, while another group did not. 
 
 Method 
Subjects  
We tested 160 participants, all members of the London School of Economics 
community.  In return for their participation, respondents received a £2 ($4) voucher for 
Starbucks.  
Materials 
The materials were based on 120 triples, each comprising two populations and one 
sample of red, yellow and blue rectangles.  The population generating algorithm was as 
follows.  First, we chose a number between 0 and 100 from a uniform distribution and 
specified this as the number of blue rectangles (call it b); next, we generated a number 
between 0 and (100-b) from a uniform distribution, and specified this as the number of green 
rectangles (g). The number of yellow rectangles was therefore y=100-b-g. This yielded 
populations with an average of 50 blue, 25 green and 25 yellow rectangles. In this way we 
generated populations that were, on average, composed of a large number of blue rectangles.  
This is analogous to many natural populations, in which the modal member is of one type, but 
in which alternative types are also relatively abundant – such as the ethnic composition of 
European and North American cities, or bird populations pretty well everywhere.   
For each question, we randomly generated a pair of populations, one of which was 
assigned a high prior of 5/6, the other a low prior of 1/6. One population was chosen with 
probability equal to its prior, and a sample of 25 rectangles was drawn (with replacement) 
from this population.  We used the first 120 stimuli sets generated, and they were presented in 
the order generated.    
 
Procedure 
Each respondent made judgments or choices for 30 triples, so the 120 triples comprised 
four replications of the basic design.  Within each replication, there were 10 participants in 
each of four groups: The Similarity group were told nothing about the context, and simply 
rated which of the larger sets of rectangles the small set was more similar to; the 
Similarity/Population group made similarity judgments, this time with full knowledge that the 
sets represented two populations and one sample; the Choice/No prior group guessed which 
population the sample came from without knowledge of prior probabilities; and the 
Choice/Prior group made the same choice but with this knowledge.   
In all conditions, respondents first read an introductory screen which told them they 
would be asked questions about ‘sets of rectangles’ and were shown an unlabelled example of 
such sets.  The instructions then diverged, depending on the experimental condition. Those in 
the Similarity group read You will see two large sets and one small set like the following and 
were shown a triple like that in Figure 2, with the three sets labeled, respectively, as Large Set 
1, Small Set and Large Set 2.  For each subsequent triple, they indicated which large set the 
small set was more similar to, using a 9-point scale that ranged from  Much more similar to 
LS 1 to Much more similar to LS 2. 
The instructions for the remaining groups included the following description of the task 
context:    
We want you to consider the following procedure. First, we randomly generated two 
populations of yellow, red and blue rectangles, which we call Population 1 and 
Population 2.  [Here the Choice/Prior group received information about prior 
probabilities, as described later…] 
Then we drew a sample of 25 rectangles from either Population 1 or Population 2.  
[Here an example was shown, with the sets labeled as Population 1, Sample, and 
Population 2.]  
We drew the sample this way:  
We randomly drew one rectangle and noted its color.  
Then, we returned the rectangle to the population and drew another one, until we 
had drawn 25 rectangles.  
The sample could have been drawn from either Population 1 or Population 2.   
Those in the Similarity/Population group then judged the similarity of the sample to 
Population 1 or Population 2 using the 9-point scale, this time with the endpoints labeled 
Much more similar to Population 1 and Much more similar to Population 2. 
For those in the two choice groups the task was to indicate which population they 
thought the sample came from.  This was done by clicking one of two radio keys. The 
instructions for the Choice/Prior group included the following information:    
First [… as above].   
Second, we rolled a die. If any number from 1 to 5 came up, we drew a sample of 25 
rectangles from one population, while if the number 6 came up, we drew a sample of 25 
rectangles from the other population.  
In the following example we drew a sample from Population 1 if the numbers 1 to 5 
came up, and drew a sample from Population 2 in the number 6 came up. [Here an 
example was shown, with five dice faces above Population 1, and one above Population 
2.] In the following example we drew a sample from Population 2 if the numbers 1 to 5 
came up, and drew a sample from Population 1 if the number 6 came up. [Here the 
example had one face above Population 1 and five above Population 2]. 
Once the population was chosen, we drew the sample this way [… the standard 
instructions followed, ending with …] The sample could have been drawn from 
either Population 1 or Population 2, depending on the roll of the die.  
For each triple in the Choice/prior group five dice faces were above the high prior population 
and one face above the low prior population. The population number of the high prior 
population was randomized.   
 In all conditions we recorded the time taken to make a choice or similarity judgment. 
 
Results 
How reliable and consistent are judgments of similarity? 
For similarity to be a reliable and valid basis for making probabilistic choices, there 
must be some “common core” underlying the similarity judgments made by different people 
and in different contexts.  We measured this core by evaluating the inter-context and inter-
subject consistency of similarity judgments.  There were four sets of 30 triples, each of which 
received similarity judgments from 20 subjects, 10 each from the Similarity and 
Similarity/Population groups.  For each set of triples, we computed the mean inter-subject 
correlation, both within and between experimental groups.   These are shown in Table 2.  As 
can be seen, the mean inter-subject correlation was high (overall ranging from .71 to .79) and 
there was no appreciable reduction in this value when attention was restricted to correlations 
between subjects in different groups (ranging from .68 to .79). 
 
-- Table 2 about here – 
 
 Given the high correlation between individual judgments, it is not surprising that the 
correlation between the average similarity judgments for the 120 questions was extremely 
high (.95).  Moreover, even the mean similarity judgments in the two groups were almost 
identical (5.06 vs 5.05), indicating that in both conditions the scale was used in the same way.   
Finally, to anticipate the next section, the proportion of correct choices predicted by both 
measures of similarity was almost identical. We conducted two logistic regressions, using 
similarity ratings to predict the optimal Bayesian choice (we will call this BayesChoice).  The 
percentage of correct predictions was 86% for both Similarity groups, and these were 
distributed almost identically across both Populations 1 and 2. Because the two similarity 
measures are statistically interchangeable, we usually report results from combining the two 
measures.   
Overall, these analyses show that the judgments of similarity in both contexts contained 
a substantial common core. We conclude, therefore, that similarity judgments are reliable. We 
next turn to the question of their validity as a basis for probabilistic choice. 
 
How accurate is the similarity heuristic?   
We simulated the performance of the similarity heuristic in two ways.  First, we 
examined the correlation between the 9-point similarity rating and the option that would be 
chosen by an optimal application of Bayes’ rule (denoted BayesChoice).  Figure 3 shows the 
proportion of times BayesChoice equals Population 2, for each level of Similarity.  This 
proportion increases monotonically in an S-shaped pattern, with virtually no Population 2 
options predicted when Similarity=1 and almost 100% when Similarity=9.  The correlation 
between individual similarity judgments and BayesChoice is .76.  
 
—Figure 3 about here -- 
We also compared the accuracy of the similarity heuristic with that achieved using 
Bayes’ rule and the likelihood heuristic (BayesChoice and LKChoice).  We simulated the 
heuristic using the principles described previously:  if the Similarity rating was less than 5 
(i.e., implying ( ) ( )1 2, ,s d h s d h> ) then predict a choice of Population 1, if it is equal to 5 then 
predict either population with probability of .5, otherwise predict Population 2 (we use 
SimChoice to denote these individual simulated choices).  Simchoice correctly predicted the 
population from which the sample was drawn 86% of the time, compared to 94% for 
LKChoice and 97% for BayesChoice.   
Because similarity is a psychological judgment it is, unlike likelihoods and prior 
probabilities, prone to error.  To obtain a low-error judgment of similarity, we took the mean 
similarity judgment for each question and applied our decision rule to this mean (i.e., if mean 
Similarity < 5 choose Population 1, etc.). We denote these choices Simchoice/A (for 
aggregate).  Relative to Simchoice, using Simchoice/A increased the correlation between the 
similarity heuristic and BayesChoice from .76 to .85, and increased overall accuracy from 
86% to 92%.    
In this context, therefore, the similarity heuristic achieves a high level of accuracy when 
making probabilistic choices. But this does not demonstrate that people actually take the 
opportunity to use similarity when making choices.  This is what we evaluate next.  
 
 
Do people use the similarity heuristic? 
Similarity/Choice agreement.  For each respondent in the two choice groups, we 
compared the choices they made to the predictions of Simchoice/A.  Figure 4 shows, for each 
respondent in the Choice/No prior and Choice/Prior groups, the proportion of correct 
predictions.  There was an extremely good fit between actual and predicted choices:  an 
average of 89% predictions in the No prior group (Median 92%), and 86% in the Prior group 
(Median 90%).  
 
—Figure 4 about here -- 
   
 
 This is not an irrefutable demonstration that people use the similarity heuristic, since 
both choice and similarity judgments are also highly correlated with BayesChoice, leaving 
open the possibility that the similarity/choice relationship might not be causal (i.e., similarity 
determines choice), but merely due to the use of another choice rule (or rules) that is 
correlated with both similarity and Bayes rule.  We therefore conducted two additional 
analyses to consider whether the similarity heuristic predicts choice beyond that predicted by 
BayesChoice.  First, we conducted a logistic regression in which individual choices (in both 
the Choice/No prior and Choice/Prior conditions) was regressed on the mean Similarity 
rating, the normalized likelihood ratio (NLKR) defined as ( )( )
2
21
p d h
p d h+
,  and the prior 
probability of Population 2.   The model was chosen using a forward selection procedure 
(probability for entry = .10., for removal = .15).  In both analyses, mean Similarity was the 
most significant predictor in the final model.  The logits (log odds) for the final models were: 
Choice/No-prior: 4.03 – 0.63 Similarity – 2.32 NLKR 
Choice/Prior: 5.51 – 0.89 Similarity – 2.10 Prior 
All coefficients were highly significant (p-value for Wald statistic < .0001), and classification 
accuracy was 88% for the No prior group and 87% for the Prior group.  This is strong 
evidence that the similarity heuristic was being used by both groups. Separate regressions 
including only Similarity as an explanatory variable supported this view – classification 
accuracy was reduced by less than 1% in both groups. 
Finally, to provide the strongest possible test we conduct a further analysis relating 
individual similarity judgments to individual choices.  Because we did not collect similarity 
judgments and choices from the same respondents, we created “quasi-subjects,” simply by 
placing the individual responses in all four conditions into four columns of our data file, and 
then analyzing the relationships between conditions as if they had been collected from the 
same respondent.  We lined up, for instance, the response from the first respondent who made 
a similarity judgment to one item, with the first respondent who made a choice to that item, 
and so forth.  Our reasoning was that if the similarity heuristic is robust to being tested under 
these unpromising circumstances, it will surely be robust to tests when both choices and 
similarity judgments come from the same respondent. 
 
-- Table 3 about here -- 
 
 We conducted two correlational analyses of these data, as shown in Table 3.  First, we 
looked at the first order correlation between Simchoice, Simchoice/Pop, Choice/Prior and 
Choice/No prior.  These were, as can be seen in Table 3, moderately high (≅ .6) and 
overwhelmingly significant.  This indicates that the relationship found with the aggregate 
similarity judgments does not vanish when they are disaggregated.  We then conducted the 
same analysis, but this time partialling out three alternate choice predictors:  LKChoice, 
BayesChoice, and the Prior – these predictors are all highly intercorrelated but we included 
them to squeeze out the maximum predictive power. The partial correlations were reduced, 
but all remained positive and significant.  Thus, individual similarity judgments made by one 
respondent were able to robustly predict the individual choices made by another respondentviii. 
Response times.  A further line of evidence that choice is based on the similarity 
heuristic comes from the pattern of response times (RTs), which suggest that both choices and 
similarity judgments are driven by the same psychological process.  Figure 5 is a boxplot 
showing the distribution of median RTs for each triple, for all four conditions.  This shows the 
average RT and its distribution and its distribution, is approximately the same for all 
conditions, an observation supported by a non-significant ANOVA 
( (3,  357) 1.7,  .15F p= > ).  
 
—Figure 5 about here – 
 
 
 Table 4 shows correlations between median RTs for all triples.  All the relationships 
are highly significant ( .0001,  120p n< = ) and, more importantly, correlations within 
response categories (Similarity with Similarity/Population, and Choice/No prior with 
Choice/Prior, Mean r = .70) are close to those between categories (Similarity with Choice, 
Mean r=.65).  This occurs despite an undoubted level of method variance due to the different 
response formats in the two categories (a choice between two radio keys versus rating on a 9-
point scale). 
 
-- Table 4 about here – 
 
Moreover, choice response times show a relationship that should be expected if 
similarity judgments are the basis for choice.  When the sample is equally similar to the two 
populations (i.e., similarity judgments are close to the scale midpoint) it also takes longer to 
choose which population it came from. Figure 6 plots the median response time for all 120 
questions against the average Similarity judgment for each question, along with the best 
fitting quadratic function.  In both cases this function revealed the expected significant 
inverted-U functionix.   
 
-- Figure 6 about here -- 
 
 
Overall, therefore, analysis of the responses made and the time taken to make them 
closely fit what we would expect if choices are based on the similarity heuristic.  
 
How is prior probability information used? 
Consistent with much earlier research (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hell & Blank, 1988; Fischhoff, 
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1979), we found that prior probabilities influenced choice in the right 
direction but were underweighted.  Respondents in the Choice/Prior condition were 
significantly more likely to choose the high prior item than were those in the Choice/No Prior 
condition (76% versus 71%; 2(1,  119) 20.4,  .146,  .001F pε= = < ), although they still chose 
it at a lower rate than the actual prior probability (83%, or 5/6).  Our design enabled us to go 
further and determine whether knowledge of prior probabilities improved choice, and more 
generally whether the knowledge was used strategically. 
Knowledge of priors did not increase accuracy, which was 86.3% in the Choice/Prior 
condition and 86.1% in the Choice/No prior condition ( (1,  119) 1F < ). This suggests that 
knowledge about prior probabilities was used inefficiently.  This is illustrated in Figure 7, 
which shows, for both choice groups, the proportion of times the correct choice was made 
when the sample was drawn from high prior population versus when it was drawn from the 
low prior population (we will say, when the prior is consistent and inconsistent). When the 
prior was consistent, the Choice/Prior group was a little more accurate than the Choice/No 
prior group (90% versus 87%), but when it was inconsistent, they were much less accurate 
(74% versus 82%).  This was reliable result: an ANOVA with the group as a within-triple 
factor, and consistency of priors as a between-triple factor, revealed a highly significant 
interaction, 2(1,  118) 17.7,  .131,  .001F pε= = < . Since the prior was consistent 83% of the 
time, the small benefit it gave when consistent was counterbalanced by the larger cost when it 
was inconsistent. 
 
-- Figure 7 about here -- 
 
 
A strategic way to combine knowledge of prior probabilities with similarity data is to 
go with the high prior option when the sample is equally similar to both populations, but to go 
with similarity when it is highly similar to only one population.  This can be seen by referring 
to Table 1:  knowledge of priors is less useful when the environment is represented by the 
columns to the right, when the two hypotheses are highly distinguishable, than when it is 
represented by the columns to the left.  We investigated to what degree respondents were 
strategically putting more weight on priors when they found themselves in situations like the 
left rather than the right columns.   The fact that performance was not improved by 
knowledge of priors suggests they were not using the information strategically, and we 
confirmed this by examining the difference between the proportion of time the high prior item 
was chosen in the Choice/Prior versus Choice/No prior groups, as a function of similarity 
judgments. We define PrEqHi and NoPrEqHi as, respectively, the proportion of times the 
Choice/Prior and Choice/No prior groups chose the high prior option for each triple, and then 
computed a proportional shift statistic (PSS) for each triple, which was an index of the 
increase in choices of the high prior item in response to having that information.   
 
1
1
i
PrEqHi NoPrEqHi
    if  PrEqHi NoPrEqHi
NoPrEqHi
PSS       
PrEqHi NoPrEqHi
   if  PrEqHi NoPrEqHi
PrEqHi
−
>
−
= 
− ≤

−
 
 
 
The subscript i indexes the triple.  PSS ranges from -1 to 1, the difference between the 
proportion of choices of the high prior option in the two choice conditions, divided by the 
maximum possible proportion of such choices.  For example, if for one triple 90% of the 
Choice/Prior group chose the high prior item, as opposed to 80% of the Choice/No prior 
group, then PSSi would be 
.9 .8
.5
1.0 .8
−
=
−
. On the other hand, if 90% in the Choice/No prior 
group chose the high prior item while only 80% in the Choice/Prior  group did, then PSSi =(-
.5).  Because PSS cannot be computed if both PrEqHi and NoPrEqHi are equal to 1, which 
occurred in 33 cases, we obtained 87 usable values of PSS, with a mean value of .13 
(SD=.62).   The fact that the number is positive indicates respondents were more likely to 
choose the high prior item when they knew which one it was, and the specific value obtained 
can be interpreted as follows:  for the average triple, if the high prior item was chosen by a 
proportion p of those in the Choice/No prior group, then it was chosen by ( ).13 1p p+ −  of 
those in the Choice/Prior group.   
Figure 8 shows the 87 values of PSS as a function of the mean similarity rating for each 
triple, along with the best fitting quadratic function.  If knowledge of prior probabilities was 
being used strategically, this best-fitting function would have an inverse-U shape, indicating 
that prior probabilities had their greatest influence when the sample was equally similar to 
both populations.  In fact, the quadratic function has the opposite shape to this hypothesized 
inverse-U, although it accounts for relatively little of the variance in PSS (R2=.021).  That is, 
while knowledge of population prior probability did increase the tendency to choose the high 
prior item, it did so indiscriminately – respondents in the Choice/Prior condition put equal 
weight on the prior when similarity was undiagnostic (when knowledge of the prior would be 
useful) than when it was diagnostic (and the knowledge was relatively useless).   
 
—Figure 8 about here – 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 Willard Quine famously described the problem of induction as being a question about 
the use of what we call the similarity heuristic:    
For me, then, the problem of induction is a problem about the world: a problem of how 
we, as we now are (by our present scientific lights), in a world we never made, should 
stand better than random or coin-tossing chances of coming out right, when we predict 
by inductions which are based on our innate, scientifically unjustified similarity 
standard.  (Quine, 1969, p. 127). 
Our research can be viewed as an investigation into just how much better than ‘random’ are 
these predictions, and our findings are that they are, at least in one context, very much better.  
In the environment in which our respondents found themselves, individual similarity 
judgments were able to come out right 86% of the time, compared to coin-tossing chances of 
50%.  Moreover, we also found strong evidence that people were using a shared, if not 
necessarily innate, similarity standard to make their choices – the similarity judgments made 
by one group proved to be an excellent predictor of both the similarity judgments and the 
choices made by other groups. 
As we noted earlier, although the similarity heuristic is a subset of the 
representativeness heuristic first described by Kahneman and Tversky (1972), we modeled 
our approach on the program of a different school of researchers.  This program, well-
summarized in Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) seminal article on the recognition heuristic, 
is to: 
design and test computational models of [cognitive] heuristics that are (a) ecologically 
rational (i.e., they exploit structures of information in the environment), (b) founded in 
evolved psychological capacities such as memory and the perceptual system, (c) fast, 
frugal and simple [and accurate] enough to operate effectively when time, knowledge 
and computational might are limited, (d) precise enough to be modeled 
computationally, and (e) powerful enough to model both good and poor reasoning.  
(p.75) 
In the rest of this discussion we comment on the relationship between this program and our 
own investigations.  
 
Ecological rationality  
The concept of ecological rationality is best described by the means of the lens model 
of Brunswik (1952, 1955; c.f. Dhami et. al, 2004), a familiar modernized version of which is 
shown in Figure 9 (e.g., Hammond, 1996).  The judge or decision maker seeks to evaluate an 
unobservable criterion, such as a magnitude or probability.  While she cannot observe the 
criterion directly, she can observe one or more fallible cues or indicators (denoted I in the 
figure) that are correlated with the criterion.  Judgments are based on the observable 
indicators, and the accuracy (or ‘ecological rationality’) of those judgments is indexed by 
their correlation with the unobservable variable.  For the recognition heuristic, the judgment is 
recognition (“I have seen this before”), which is a valid predictor of many otherwise 
unobservable criteria (e.g., size of cities, company earnings), because it is itself causally 
linked to numerous indicators of those criteria (e.g., appearance in newspapers or on TV).   
 
-- Figure 9 about here – 
 
 
The ecological rationality of the similarity heuristic arises for similar reasons. Although 
researchers do not yet have a complete understanding of how similarity judgments are made, 
we do know that the similarity between a case x and another case or class A or B is a function 
of shared and distinctive features and characteristics (see Goldstone & Son, 2005, for a 
review).  Likewise, the probability that x is a sample from a given population is closely 
related to the characteristics that x shares and does not share with other members of that 
population.   It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that similarity turns out to be such a 
reliable and valid index of class membership. 
 
Evolved psychological capacities   
Both the recognition and similarity heuristics work through a process of attribute 
substitution (recognition substituted for knowledge of magnitude, similarity substituted for 
knowledge of posterior probabilities), and are effective because of the strong correlation 
between the attribute being substituted for and its substitution.  The reason for this high 
correlation is because both the capacity to recognize and the capacity to detect similarity are 
both products of natural selection. 
 The ability to assess the similarity between two objects, or between one object and 
the members of a class of objects, is central to any act of generalization (e.g., Attneave, 1950; 
Goldstone & Son, 2005).  As Quine (1969) observed, to acquire even the simplest concept 
(such as ‘yellow’) requires ’a fully functioning sense of similarity, and relative similarity at 
that: a is more similar to b than to c’ (p. 122).  Some such ‘sense of similarity’ is undoubtedly 
innate.  Children are observed making similarity judgments as early as it is possible to make 
the observations (e.g., Smith, 1989), and it is one of the ‘automatic’ cognitive processes that 
remain when capacity is limited by time pressure or divided attention (Smith & Kemler-
Nelson, 1984; Ward, 1983).  Like recognition and recall, therefore, the ability to judge 
similarity is a skill we are born with and can deploy at minimal cognitive cost whenever it can 
serve our purposes. The similarity heuristic, like other fast-and-frugal heuristics, operates by 
‘piggy-backing’ on this innate ability when probability judgments are to be made. 
Although we have spoken blithely about ‘similarity judgments’ we recognize that these 
judgments are embedded in specific contexts.  For instance, if asked to judge the similarity 
between a celery stick, a rhubarb stalk and an apple, the judgment s(apple, rhubarb) will be 
greater than s(celery, rhubarb) if the criterion is ‘dessert’ than if it is ‘shape.’  Indeed, the 
concept of similarity has been widely criticized because of this. Medin, Goldstone and 
Gentner (1993) give a concise summary of this critique: 
The only way to make similarity nonarbitrary is to constrain the predicates that apply or 
enter into the computation of similarity. It is these constraints and not some abstract 
principle of similarity that should enter one's accounts of induction, categorization, and 
problem solving. To gloss over the need to identify these constraints by appealing to 
similarity is to ignore the central issue. (p. 255). 
This criticism is related to the question of whether the concept of similarity can be fully 
defined is a context free manner.   It is likely that it cannot.  The criticism does not, however, 
bear on the question of whether people make similarity judgments, nor whether those 
judgments are reliable.  It is clear that people do and the judgments are.  In our study, the 
correlation between average similarity judgments in different contexts was extremely high 
(.95), but this is not an isolated result – even in studies designed to distinguish between 
theories of similarity, similarity judgments are highly correlated across conditions.  For 
instance, in a study using a systematic design to demonstrate asymmetry in similarity 
judgments, Medin et. al. (1993) obtained the expected asymmetries, yet the correlation 
between the average similarity judgments for the same pairs in different contexts was .91 (see 
their Table 1 for data; studies reported in Tversky and Gati, 1978, all yield the same 
conclusions).  It appears that however people make their judgments of similarity these 
judgments are (a) highly consistent across contexts and across people, (b) good predictors of 
the likelihood that a sample comes from a population, and (c) actually used to make these 
judgments of likelihood.  
  
Fast, frugal, simple and accurate   
These criteria concern the relative performance of heuristics.  We can readily suggest 
ideal benchmarks for each criterion, but the standard that must be reached for us to say that 
the heuristic is frugal or fast or accurate is a matter for judgment and context. We will give an 
account of the performance of the similarity heuristic on some measures of these criteria, 
along with an indication of our own opinion about whether the heuristic reaches one standard 
or another.  
 When measuring the speed of a decision process, the optimum time is always 0 
seconds.  No actual process can achieve this, but the time taken to make a judgment of 
similarity was typically about 6 seconds (as shown in Figure 5).  Although we cannot 
benchmark this time against other tasks, we suggest it is very little time given that it involved 
two similarity judgments, a comparison between them, and a physical response on a 9-point 
scale.    
We can assess simplicity and frugality by comparing the similarity heuristic to the 
process of making judgments by means of Bayes’ rule.  A quantitative estimate can be 
derived by drawing on the concept of Elementary Information Process (EIP), introduced by 
Payne, Bettmann and Johnson (1993), to measure the effort required to perform a cognitive 
task.  An EIP is a basic cognitive transformation or operation, such as making comparisons or 
adding numbers.  Consider the simple case, as in our experiment, of a choice between two 
hypotheses given one piece of data.  The similarity heuristic, as described in Eq. (3), requires 
three EIPs:  two judgments of similarity, and one comparison between them.  To apply Bayes’ 
rule, in contrast, requires seven EIPs, as in the reduced form of Eq. (2): four calculations (two 
priors and two likelihoods), two products (multiplication of priors by likelihoods) and one 
comparison (between the products).  Using this measure, Bayes’ rule is more than twice as 
costly as the similarity heuristicx.  Moreover, not all EIPs are equal: if it is harder to multiply 
probabilities and likelihoods than to make ordinal comparisons, and harder to estimate 
likelihoods than to make judgments of similarity, then the advantage of the similarity heuristic 
grows. Clearly, the similarity heuristic is frugal relative to the Bayesian decision rule.   
The similarity heuristic also performed much better than chance and proved to be a 
reliable choice rule.  It is worth observing here that the location of one source of disagreement 
between researchers in the two heuristics ‘traditions’ is exemplified by the contrast between 
the accuracy achieved in our study, and that achieved by the earlier study of Bar-Hillel.  Bar-
Hillel (1974) observed accuracy of 10%, based on group data, while the corresponding value 
in our study is 92% (for group data, 86% for individual judgments).  Moreover, this value of 
92% is achieved despite the complicating factor of a prior probability not known to those 
making similarity judgments, and to a less transparent way of presenting information (as 
disaggregated populations and samples rather than graphs).  The difference in studies is found 
in the choice of design.  We drew on the ideals of the representative design described by 
Brunswik (1955), and argued for by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996).  Once we established a 
random sampling procedure, we did not further constrain our samples to have any specific 
properties.  Bar-Hillel (1974), on the other hand, deliberately chose items for which the 
theorized decision-rule and Bayes’ rule would yield different choices.   If we took Bar-
Hillel’s study as providing a test of the accuracy of the similarity heuristic, we would 
conclude that it was highly inaccurate. This would obviously be an illegitimate conclusion 
(and one that Bar-Hillel did not draw).   
There is an additional methodological lesson to be drawn from a comparison between 
Bar-Hillel’s (1974) study and ours.  Although the normative performance of the similarity 
heuristic differed greatly between studies, the degree to which the heuristic predicted choice 
did not.  Bar-Hillel reported her data in the form of a cross-tabulation between choices based 
on the average similarity judgment for each triple (in her case a two-point scale) and the 
majority choice for triples.  In Table 5 we show her original data and compare it to the same 
analysis conducted for our data.  The patterns of results are readily comparable, and lead to 
the same conclusions not just about whether the similarity heuristic predicts choice, but even 
about the approximate strength of the relationship between choice and judgment. 
 
-- Table 5 about here – 
 
Precise enough to be modeled computationally  
The similarity heuristic is also precise enough to be modeled computationally. In an 
earlier section we provided a general mathematical model of the similarity heuristic. It was 
not the only possible model; in fact, it was the simplest one.  However, it turned out to be a 
very good model in the context of our experiment.   When similarity judgments made by one 
group are used to predict the choices of another group, they predict those choices remarkably 
well. 
 
Powerful enough to model both good and poor reasoning  
All heuristics have a domain in which their application is appropriate, and when they 
step outside that domain they can go wrong.  We have already considered the performance of 
the likelihood heuristic as a proxy for the similarity heuristic, and suggested the similarity 
heuristic will be most accurate when the likelihood heuristic is, and inaccurate when it is not. 
Specifically, and as shown formally by Edwards et al. (1963), the similarity heuristic can go 
wrong when some hypotheses have exceedingly low priors, and when the similarity 
judgments s(d,h) do not strongly differentiate between hypotheses.   
 A fascinating recent case in which the ideal conditions are not met, and the similarity 
heuristic (probably coupled with some wishful thinking) leads to some unlikely judgments is 
found in the scientific debate surrounding the identification of some observed woodpeckers, 
which might be of the ivory-billed or pileated species (White, 2006; Fitzpatrick et al, 2005).  
The two birds are very similar.  Careful scrutiny can distinguish them, although to the 
untutored eye they would be practically identical. The prior probabilities of the two 
hypotheses, however, are not even remotely close to equal. The pileated woodpecker is 
relatively common, but the last definite sighting of the ivory billed woodpecker was in 1944, 
and there is every reason to believe it is extinct (i.e., prior ≈ 0).   It is interesting to observe, 
however, that the debate over whether some reported sightings of the ivory-billed woodpecker 
are genuine involves a ‘scientific’ application of the similarity heuristic (focusing on issues 
like the size of the bird and wing patterns), with little explicit reference to prior probabilities, 
even by skepticsxi.  
 The ivory-billed woodpecker case is, however, uncharacteristic and understates the 
power of the similarity heuristic even when priors are extremely low.  In the case of the ivory 
billed woodpecker, prior probabilities should play such a large role because of a conjunction 
of two factors: similarity is practically undiagnostic (only very enthusiastic observers can 
claim that the poor quality video evidence looks a lot more like an ivory-billed than pileated 
woodpecker), and the least-likely hypothesis has a very low prior probability.  The situation is 
therefore like that in the bottom left-hand cell of Table 1.   
But suppose the situation were different, and while the prior probability is very close to 
zero, similarity is very diagnostic.  You are out strolling one day in a dry area a long way 
from water, an area in which you know there are no swans, which only live on or very near 
water.  Yet you stumble across a bird that is very similar to a mute swan: It is a huge white 
bird with a black forehead and a long gracefully curved neck; its feet are webbed, it does not 
fly when you approach but raises its wings in a characteristic ‘sail pattern’ revealing a 
wingspan of about 1.5 meters.  Even though the prior probability of seeing a swan in this 
location is roughly 0 (i.e., this is what you would say if someone asked you the probability 
that the next bird you saw would be a swan), you will not even momentarily entertain the 
possibility that this is one of the candidates having a very high prior (such as a crow, if you 
are in the English countryside).  We suggest that most everyday cases are like the swan rather 
the woodpecker – similarity is overwhelmingly diagnostic, and is an excellent guide to choice 
and decision even in the face of most unpromising priors.  This is why, to return to Quine, we 
can do so well using our ‘innate, scientifically unjustified similarity standard.’  
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 Table 1: Accuracy from using the likelihood heuristic and incremental 
accuracy from using Bayes’ rule 
 
p′: Prior 
Probability 
H: Hypothesis set
 
{.5,.5} {.6,.4} {.7,.3} {.8,.2} {.9,.1} 
[.5,.5] .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
[.6,.4] .10 .00 .00 .00 .00 
[.7,.3] .20 .06 .00 .00 .00 
[.8,.2] .30 .13 .04 .00 .00 
[.9,.1] .40 .23 .09 .03 .00 
[.95,.05] .45 .27 .12 .04 .00 
( ), ,A HL p  .50 .68 .84 .94 .99 
To obtain Bayesian accuracy for each cell, add the incremental 
accuracy to ( ), ,A HL p . For instance, when { }.6,.4H = , and 
[ ].8,.2′ =p , the accuracy of the likelihood heuristic is .68 and the 
accuracy of Bayes’ rule  is ( ), , .68 .13 .81A H = + =B p . 
 
 Table 2: Mean inter-subject correlation between similarity judgments, 
both intra- and inter-context 
 
Set Similarity Similarity/ Population 
Inter-
context Overall 
1 .79 .69 .68 .71 
2 .67 .76 .72 .72 
3 .85 .73 .79 .79 
4 .76 .69 .72 .72 
 
 Table 3: Correlations between individual choices by “quasi-subjects” in the four 
conditions (N=1200). P<.001 except *p<.01. 
 
  Similarity/ 
Population 
Choice/No 
Prior 
Choice/ 
Prior  
First-order 
correlations 
Similarity 0.67 0.66 0.61 
Similarity/Population -- 0.61 0.59 
Choice/No Prior  -- 0.61 
LKChoice, 
PrChoice and 
BayesChoice 
partialled out 
Similarity 0.26 0.21 0.11 
Similarity/Population -- 0.12 *0.07 
Choice/No Prior  -- 0.12 
 
 
 Table 4: Correlations between median RTs in the four conditions 
  
 Similarity/ 
Population 
Choice/No 
Prior 
Choice/ 
Prior 
Similarity 0.66 0.51 0.68 
Similarity/Population -- 0.63 0.76 
Choice/No Prior  -- 0.74 
 
  
Table 5: A cross-tabulation between choices based on the average similarity 
judgment and the majority choice for triples, in Bar Hillel’s 1974 study and in ours 
 
Bar-Hillel (1974)  Our data 
  Choice    Choice 
  Pop L Pop R    Pop 1 Pop 2 
Similarity Pop L 11 0  Similarity Pop 1 54 3 Pop R 4 13  Pop 2 3 60 
  φ = .75     φ = .90  
 
Figure captions 
 
Figure 1:  Typical stimuli used by Bar-Hillel (1974).  The dashed line in Panel L is 
not in the original. 
 
Figure 2:  Stimuli consisting of two populations of 100 rectangles and a sample of 25 
rectangles. 
 
Figure 3:  The proportion of times that Population 2 would be chosen by Bayes’ rule, 
as a function of the 9-point similarity scale. 
 
Figure 4:  The proportion of correct choice predictions for each respondent in the two 
choice groups. 
 
Figure 5:  Boxplots of median RT in the four conditions. 
 
Figure 6:  Median response time plotted against average Similarity judgment for both 
choice conditions. 
 
Figure 7:  Accuracy (BayesChoice) as a function of consistency between prior 
probability and correct choice. 
 
Figure 8: Proportional shift statistic (PSS) as a function of the mean similarity rating 
for individual questions. 
 
Figure 9:  Lens model adapted from Brunswik. 
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Endnotes 
 
i
  This is a further demonstration of the availability heuristic in action.  If the only probability judgments we can 
remember are the ‘Linda’ or ‘Taxicab’ problem, then we might well overestimate the frequency with which such 
erroneous judgments are made.   
ii
 Gilovich & Griffin (2003, p.8) observe that  ‘studies in this [heuristics and biases] tradition have paid scant 
attention to assessing the overall ecological validity of heuristic processes…assessing the ecological validity of the 
representativeness heuristic would involve identifying a universe of relevant objects and then correlating the 
outcome value for each object with the value of the cue variable for each object… . This Herculean task has not 
attracted researchers in the heuristics and biases tradition; the focus has been on identifying the cues that people use, 
not on evaluating the overall value of those cues.’ 
iii
 The term has been used before. Medin, Goldstone and Gentner (1993) use it to refer to the use of similarity as a 
guide to making ‘educated guesses’ in the face of uncertainty, a view which closely reflects our own.   Kahneman 
and Frederick (2002) used the term as an alternative label for the representativeness heuristic itself.   
iv
 In a simulation study, we found only 0.3% of possible stimuli have all four properties of Bar-Hillel’s samples.   
v
 Similarity is a complex judgment and in this paper we do not consider how it is assessed.   For recent candidate 
models of similarity judgment see Kemp, Bernstein and Tenenbaum, 2005, and Navarro and Lee, 2004.   
vi
 The damping parameter adopted by Nilsson et al. (2005; see their Eq. (2)) can be incorporated by introducing a 
further stage in the model, between the similarity vector and maximum similarity vector.   
vii
 Condition (c) is always applicable to our analysis, since the prior probability of all hypotheses other than Urn A or 
Urn B is 0. 
viii
 This analysis cannot be interpreted as showing how much the similarity heuristic is contributing to choice.  
Rather, similarity judgments work because they are highly correlated with the statistical basis for choice and 
therefore when we partial out LKChoice and BayesChoice, we are also partialling out the factors that make it a good 
decision rule.  The analysis is rather a decisive demonstration that we cannot say respondents are “merely” 
computing Bayesian posterior probabilities and responding accordingly.   
ix
 The linear function accounted for none of the variance in median RT, and a cubic function yielded identical fit to 
the quadratic.   
x
 This is a general result.  If there are n hypotheses to be tested, the similarity heuristic calls on 2n-1 EIPs (n 
calculations and n-1 comparisons), while the normative rule calls on 4n-1 EIPs (2n calculations, n products, and n-1 
comparisons).   
xi
 Much of the debate revolves around a fuzzy film in which a woodpecker is seen in the distance for 4 seconds (e.g. 
Fitzpatrick et al., 2005).  Given the extremely low prior probability that any ivory-billed woodpecker is alive, it 
could be argued that even under its best interpretation this evidence could never warrant concluding that the 
posterior probability is appreciably greater than zero.  
 
